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Virtue and Flourishing in  
Our Interpersonal Relationships
Lorraine Besser-Jones
 “Some philosophers say that true happiness comes from a life of virtue.” So 
says Hobbes to Calvin, as Calvin is about to throw a snowball at Susie. Calvin 
stops, and proceeds to test this hypothesis. He cleans his room, shovels the 
driveway, makes his mom a card, and generally is a good boy. But he finds himself 
frustrated. The next chance he gets, he pegs Susie with a snowball, declaring, 
“Someday I’ll write my own philosophy book.” Hobbes agrees, noting, “Virtue 
needs some cheaper thrills.”1
 The position that with virtue comes true happiness is one that has its roots 
in Aristotle. Aristotle believed that true happiness—what he calls eudaimonia—
consists in the exercise of virtue. The virtuous person, he holds, is one who 
possesses the virtues and has the practical wisdom to know when and how she 
ought to exercise them. She has “the [virtuous] feelings at the right times, about 
the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, in the right way” 
(Aristotle, 1962, sec. 1106b 17–23). When the virtuous person does all this, and 
exercises virtue, she experiences a distinct form of pleasure; pleasure that, on 
Aristotle’s account, completes the activity. The picture we get from Aristotle one 
that associates true happiness with the development of one’s capacities; where 
one’s reason and passions are working in harmony; where one’s skills are being 
tested and where one is succeeding.
 And, of course, this all sounds great. But we can’t shake Hobbes’s insight: 
“Virtue needs some cheaper thrills.”
 Contemporary moral philosophers have spent much time analyzing Aristotle’s 
position, which we can understand in terms of the “eudaimonistic thesis”. 
The eudaimonistic thesis holds that a necessary condition of true happiness is 
possession and exercise of the virtues. One fundamental idea emerging from 
discussion of this thesis is that there are different kinds of happiness. (Notice 
the cartoon speaks of “true” happiness). The kind of happiness Aristotle had in 
mind, and that is likely associated with virtue, is not the subjective, pleasing or 
joyful attitude that ordinary language references as “happiness”. This is why most 
philosophers refer to the Aristotelian understanding of happiness as “eudaimonia” 
or “flourishing” rather than happiness. True happiness, on this understanding, 
consists in living well—in developing a stable and enduring kind of well-being.
Once we recognize that there can be different senses of happiness, the question 
now becomes whether or not there is some sense of happiness that is correlated 
with virtue in the way suggested by the eudaimonistic thesis. Here, unsurprisingly, 
philosophers disagree. Some think this is clearly true—at least once we recognize 
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the difference between “true” happiness, and the fleeting, whimsical forms of 
happiness that revolve upon feeling some kind of pleasure (e.g., Annas, 1998; Taylor, 
2002). Others worry that it is true only when we do some fancy philosophical 
footwork and create an understanding of happiness that is far removed from our 
ordinary understanding of it (Conly, 1988; Haybron, 2007; Cahn, 2004). We 
so preserve the thesis, but at the cost of making it irrelevant. If virtue is related 
to a kind of happiness that I cannot identify with, or appreciate as a state that 
I want to be in, then I find myself in the same position as Calvin, at the end of 
his virtuous turn: frustrated, and ready to peg someone with a snowball.
 My own approach to these issues is to recognize that the eudaimonistic thesis 
is, at its heart, an empirical claim. It claims that being virtuous is a necessary 
aspect of the development of some important kind of happiness. To be true as 
an empirical claim, it must be the case that virtue is associated with a kind of 
happiness that is clearly recognizable as something that we want, that we can 
appreciate as a good state for us to be in, that we can identify as a state of our own 
well-being. And this, of course, is an empirical claim: in our ordinary experiences, 
is it the case that virtue is necessary to developing this kind of state?
 This is a very large, and very important, question. In this paper, I chip 
away at one piece of this question by exploring virtue’s role in mediating our 
relationships with others. Caring about others and treating them well is clearly 
part of being virtuous (no matter how we construe the virtues) and I think it 
is also one aspect of being virtuous that we can see to be an important part of 
our happiness—at least, in our non-skeptical moments. As a first step towards 
examining the empirical validity of the eudaimonic thesis, we ought to consider 
whether or not it is true that being virtuous is necessary to our happiness insofar 
as it enables us to develop the kind of relationships we need in order to develop 
true happiness.
 There are three parts to my discussion. I begin with a brief reflection on what 
I take to be some ordinary views about the extent to which we need to treat others 
well and the limitations associated with this perspective. I then explore in detail 
psychological research detailing the nature and extent of our social needs. This 
research, I argue, gives us good reason to believe that genuine virtue is requisite 
to the satisfaction of our social needs. I conclude by assessing what the above 
reflection tells us about the eudaimonistic thesis and the connection between 
virtue and happiness. I argue that it shows that virtue is necessary for positive 
functioning, yet not sufficient for true happiness. I then offer some reasons for 
thinking that this is as it should be, that this gives us the right understanding of 
the connection between happiness and virtue.
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The Skeptical Stance
 Even in our most cynical moments, it is hard to deny that we need others—
not just to make our lives easier, but on a more fundamental level, to help us 
develop as persons. We know, from a distance, about the devastating effects 
extreme social isolation has upon the cognitive development of individuals. We 
also know, from personal experience, how interacting with others allows us to 
develop personally—how brainstorming with another can help us to formulate 
new ideas; how learning about another’s culture can give us deeper appreciation 
of our own, and so on.
 But I suspect that even the best of us can’t shake the lurking suspicion that 
we can get what we need from others without necessarily treating them well. 
After all, it is one thing to recognize that we need others, and another thing to 
argue that this means we ought to treat others well in the sense typically required 
by virtue—to respect them and, even, to care about them. And we can think of 
all sorts of examples attesting to this. We can think of the person who is warm 
and caring to his friends and family and who would do anything for them, yet 
cruel to those outside this close circle. We can think of the shrewd yet popular 
businessman, who always has a smile on his face and a dollar in his pocket for 
the homeless, yet who does not care about others or respect them in the slightest. 
The photo-op and the consequent reputation are the things that drive him, not a 
concern for the welfare of others. If these individuals, and the many others like 
them, can get what they need from others without developing the care and respect 
for them that is distinctive of virtue, then we genuinely ought to be skeptical of 
the eudaimonic thesis.
 Two beliefs drive this skepticism. The first is the belief, illustrated by the good 
friend, yet terrible stranger, that we can get what we need from only a few, so that we 
can by and large get away with treating poorly those who are outside of our narrow 
circle. The second is the belief, illustrated by the “flourishing” businessman, that 
we can get what we need from others without actually caring about them. These 
beliefs are pervasive; even those of us who find that they are false in our own 
experiences likely are hesitant to deny the possibility of the claims they espouse.
 In an effort to prove these beliefs mistaken, in what follows I explore what 
social psychological has to say about the extent and nature of our social needs. I 
begin by reviewing empirical research regarding our social needs and specifically 
our “need for relatedness”. I then explore the extent to which we need others and 
show that we cannot satisfy our need for relatedness solely through engagement 
with a narrow circle of companions. I go on to explore the nature of our need for 
relatedness and show that satisfying our need for relatedness involves not only 
behaving in certain ways towards others, but also developing appropriate attitudes 
towards them.
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The Need for Relatedness
 The fact that we need to relate positively to others comes as no surprise; 
social interaction is widely acknowledged to be essential to psychological health 
and well-being. Psychologists describe this aspect of our social needs in terms 
of the need for relatedness, which is an innate psychological need that drives 
us to seek out certain kinds of experiences (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ryan & 
Deci, 2002).2 We will explore later exactly what kinds of experiences this need 
drives us towards, but for now we can understand them quite generally in terms 
of experiencing belongingness with individuals and with our community (Ryan 
& Deci, 2002).3
 As is the case with all innate psychological needs, negative consequences 
result when we fail to engage in the experiences towards which the need drives 
us. Some of the negative consequences are unsurprising and transparently 
connected to their cause: We are depressed; we begin to think poorly of ourselves 
and anxious at others. But others are more surprising and occur without us 
even being aware of them: our problem-solving capacity slows down and we face 
difficulties controlling our emotions. To reach a full understanding of what we 
are up against, let’s take a detailed look at some of these consequences.
 Psychological implications. The psychological implications of failing to relate well 
towards others are long and many. Whereas social inclusion clearly has positive 
effects on one’s levels of happiness and life-satisfaction and appears to be one of 
the few objective criteria of these subjective accounts of well-being (Baumeister, 
1991), social exclusion appears to be a primary cause of negative feelings such as 
anxiety, grief, depression, jealousy, and guilt and is also correlated with significantly 
higher rates of mental illness and suicide (e.g Rothberg & Jones, 1987; Trout, 
1980).4
 While these studies stress the significance of belongingness within a 
community, other studies demonstrate the significance of developing close, 
personal relationships. For instance, there is considerable evidence demonstrating 
that married couples are both physically and emotionally better off than divorced 
or never-married people. One study by Bloom, White, and Asher (1978) shows 
that the incidence of mental illness, as evidenced by mental hospital admissions, 
is highest among divorced and separated people and lowest amongst married 
people. The figures are astonishing; as Baumeister and Leary report, they show 
that “mental illness is at least 3 and possibly up to 22 times higher among 
divorced people than among married people” (1995, p. 509). These demonstrated 
psychological effects of failing to relate well to others run so deep that many 
approaches to psychotherapy have as a goal fulfilling an individual’s need for 
relatedness through the therapist/patient relationship (Baumeister & Leary, 
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1995, p. 510).
 Physical implications. The psychological effects of satisfying our need for 
relatedness are probably the first ones we tend to think of, likely because of 
their tangible contributions to our subjective experiences of happiness and life-
satisfaction. But we should not mistake these effects as the primary, nor even 
most significant, effects of satisfying or failing to satisfy our need for relatedness. 
At least as important as the psychological effects are the physical and cognitive 
effects of failing to satisfy one’s need for relatedness. The causal factors of these 
effects are more difficult to trace: when a single patient dies of cancer, for instance, 
the last thing we would think of is the impact her social isolation has had on 
the development of her disease. Yet, patients who are married survive cancer at 
higher rates than patients who are single (Goodwin, Hunt, Key, & Samet, 1987). 
They also have better functioning immune systems (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1984), 
lower mortality rates (Lynch, 1979) and are better able to bear the effects of 
stress (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988).5 These beneficial effects of social 
inclusion are not limited to the development of the close, personal relationships 
specific to marriage. Social integration in general has similar effects on health; 
numerous studies demonstrate a positive correlation between social integration 
and decreased morality rates (Berkman & Syme, 1979; House, Robbins, & 
Metzner, 1982; Vogt, Mullooly, Ernst, Pope, & Hollis, 1992).
 Although one explanation of the correlation between social integration and 
health is that positive social relationships are instrumental in providing coping 
support that mitigates the physical impact of stress, Cohen and Wills (1985), 
among others (Schwarzer & Leppin, 1989, 1991), find that there is in addition 
a distinct “generalized beneficial effect” of social integration that occurs whether 
or not a person is under stress. This effect demonstrates that being a member 
of a large social network enhances well-being directly, and not only because it 
provides opportunities to develop relationships that can serve to provide coping 
support. They suggest “this kind of [direct] support could be related to well-being 
because it provides positive affect, a sense of predictability and stability in one’s 
life situation, and a recognition of self-worth” (Cohen & Wills, 1985, p. 311).
 Cognitive Implications. In many ways, the cognitive effects of satisfying or failing 
to satisfy the need for relatedness are fascinating and demonstrate in a surprising 
way the depth of our need. As many of these effects occur independently of any 
emotional reactions to one’s failures to satisfy one’s need, they also lend further 
credence to the root idea that the need for relatedness is a basic human necessity, 
which we cannot opt out of without suffering negative consequences.
 In a series of studies, Baumeister and colleagues found that social exclusion 
impacts the executive functioning of the self (Baumeister & DeWall, 2005; 
Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005; Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 
2002). Specifically, they found that individuals facing social exclusion both 
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performed poorly on cognitive tasks and found themselves unable to regulate 
their behaviors effectively. Let us consider each of these studies in turn.
In the first group of experiments, participants were told, after taking a personality 
test, that they were likely to spend their futures alone or with others (Baumeister 
& DeWall, 2005; Baumeister et al., 2002). Their grouping was random and was 
not dependent upon the results of their personality test. They were then faced with 
cognitive tasks, such as taking a portion of the reading comprehension section 
of the GRE. Participants in the “future alone” group performed the same on 
easy questions as the other group, but significantly worse than other groups on 
difficult questions, suggesting that their expectation of social exclusion interfered 
with executive functioning.
 In the second group of experiments, researchers explored whether or not 
the threat of social exclusion would impact an individual’s capacity to regulate 
her diet (Baumeister & DeWall, 2005). Individuals in these experiments were 
primed in the same fashion as the above experiments, with some participants 
being told they would spend their futures with others and some being told they 
would spend their futures alone. One set of participants were told to drink a 
healthy yet bad-tasting beverage; another set were told to taste-test cookies and 
instructed to eat only as many cookies as was necessary to judge their taste. Both 
of these tasks required self-regulation: the former required the ability to overcome 
the bad taste for the sake of the health benefits, and the latter required the 
ability to overcome temptation for the sake of health benefits. In both instances 
researchers found that those in the “future alone” group were less effective at 
self-regulation: they either drank too little of the healthy yet bad-tasting beverage 
or ate more cookies in comparison with participants assigned to the “future with 
others” group. Again, the differences were significant. Rejected participants, for 
instance, ate twice as many cookies as the accepted participants (Baumeister & 
DeWall, 2005, p. 65). Their anticipated rejection thus significantly lowered their 
capacity to self-regulate.
 One illustrative aspect of Baumeister and DeWall’s research is that the poor 
performance of those facing social exclusion did not correlate with emotional 
distress—those in the future alone group did not feel upset or anxious by their 
classification (2005, p. 59; 64). This shows that it was not the case that people 
felt distress over facing a future alone and so performed poorly as a result of their 
emotional distress. Rather, it suggests a direct link between the frustration of one’s 
need for relatedness and impaired cognitive functioning. That this link forms 
absent emotional or cognitive awareness of it makes the negative consequences 
that result effects which are beyond our control, which we cannot prevent at will. 
When our need for relatedness is thwarted, we unavoidably suffer. This research so 
affirms the need for relatedness as a basic human necessity, objectively ascribable 
to human beings. We are, at our core, socially dependent upon others.
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 The entrenched nature of our social dependence reveals something telling 
about human nature. We all know that it feels good to engage in meaningful 
social interactions with others. But I also think many of us are tempted to think 
that we can get by pretty easily without relating to others. We may sacrifice the 
positive feelings that come through social interactions, but, after all, these are just 
feelings that we can turn off without suffering further consequences. As we are 
beginning to see, however, the psychological, physical, and cognitive implications 
of the need to relate well with others shows this attitude to be mistaken. Our need 
for relatedness is deeply rooted in human nature and inescapably so. Whether 
or not an individual admits it, she needs to relate well with others in order to 
maintain positive psychological functioning.
 This section has demonstrated the deeply rooted nature of the need for 
relatedness and how failing to satisfy it affects us on psychological, physical, and 
cognitive levels. Suffice it to say, we need to satisfy our need for relatedness. We 
must now consider what kinds of interactions satisfy our need for relatedness. My 
specific focus will be on isolating the kinds of restrictions the need for relatedness 
imposes upon our interactions. Two questions guide this discussion. The first 
concerns who we need to relate to. This question tests the belief of the good friend, 
yet terrible stranger who thinks it is enough to act well towards only his close 
circle of family and friends. The second concerns how we need to relate towards 
others; this question tests the belief of the shrewd yet popular businessman who 
thinks it is enough that people like him—even though he does not invest himself 
emotionally in the needs and concerns of others.
Who do we need to relate to?
 While recognizing the deeply rooted nature of the need for relatedness, we 
might reasonably inquire about the extent of this need and specifically, whether 
or not we can satisfy our need through developing relationships with just a few 
others.6 Certainly, satisfaction of the need for relatedness is enhanced through 
the development of personal relationships with others: being and having a 
significant other (be it a romantic partner, a parent, a friend) with whom one 
can feel connected to and who makes one feel warm and secure. This is relatively 
unsurprising and does little to motivate any potential moral implications of the 
need for relatedness. Yet, as we will now see, further research regarding what we 
often take to be our most “insignificant” relationships turns up more surprising 
results with powerful moral implications. Specifically, it shows that failing to 
engage positively with those we simply encounter threatens the satisfaction of our 
need for relatedness. We thus must make an effort to engage with others both 
inside and outside of our narrow circle.
 Studies exploring the need for relatedness show that its satisfaction can be 
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threatened through “cold” interactions with individuals we interact with yet 
with whom we have no close relationship. For instance, one study of elementary 
school children conducted by Ryan and Grolnick (1986) shows a significant 
correlation between perceived classroom climates and children’s feelings of 
self-worth, competence, and control. These feelings were judged to be higher 
in classrooms where “teachers are seen as providing warmth and acceptance of 
the child” (Ryan & Grolnick, 1986, p. 552).7 A separate study demonstrates the 
negative effect cold interactions with a stranger can have (Anderson, Manoogian, 
& Reznick, 1976). In this study, children were asked to free-draw pictures with 
different colored magic markers, a task they should have found interesting and 
enjoyable. Yet, when they drew in the presence of an experimenter who avoided 
contact with them, their levels of motivation dropped. Anderson and colleagues 
describe this situation as painful and uncomfortable for both parties, observing 
that “while the experimenter was (rather painfully) striving to avoid eye contact, 
conversation, or attending to the child’s drawing, the child was striving equally 
hard to elicit some recognition or validation from the experimenter for what 
he was doing” (Anderson et al., 1976, p. 917). When, in different groups, the 
experimenter watched the children draw, his presence had no effect on their 
levels of interest and motivation.
 While many different explanations of these results are possible, it is hard 
to ignore the demonstrated connection between operating in positive social 
environments and thriving. The children in the above experiment looked to the 
experimenter for recognition, for affirmation of themselves as individuals worthy 
of attention. Where this affirmation was lacking, they failed to exhibit signs of 
positive functioning. This consequence is not limited to children, although its 
appearance is likely more dramatic in children. Studies conducted on adults who 
are ostracized demonstrate that negative consequences (including lowered moods, 
lower levels of senses of belonging, control, self-esteem, meaningful existence) 
follow from being ignored and excluded, regardless of who (or what) is doing 
the ignoring.8
 In one study, such effects followed from being ostracized by a computer 
(Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). Participants in this study took part in 
an internet-based game of ball-tossing. Experimenters divided participants into 
two groups: an inclusion group, who received one-third of the total throws, and 
the ostracized group, who received two throws early in the game, but none in the 
rest of the game. Members of each of these groups were then split between those 
told they were playing with other individuals at different universities and those 
told they were playing against a computer. Following the game, participants in 
the ostracized group reported significantly lower feelings of belongingness, self-
esteem, control, and meaningful existence, than those reported by participants 
in the inclusion group, regardless of whether they believed they were playing 
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against an individual or a computer.9 Zadro and colleagues conclude from this 
study that the sources of ostracism do not matter; that we are so sensitive to being 
excluded that we respond negatively to the “slightest hint of social exclusion” 
(2004, p. 560).
 The likely explanation of why we are so vulnerable to social exclusion, to 
which Zadro and colleague’s discussion points, is that even an isolated instance 
of social rejection leads individuals to feel more vulnerable to future rejections 
(Baumeister & DeWall, 2005, p. 56; Zadro et al., 2004, p. 567). The problem 
is this: any sort of social exclusion impedes the satisfaction of individuals’ basic 
needs and so diminishes their very capacity for positive functioning. Ostracized 
individuals find themselves lacking the capacity to rise above the rejection and to 
engage in the positive social interaction they require. A vicious cycle is generated 
by “even a seemingly limited social rejection or exclusion”, culminating in the 
impairment of the self’s executive functioning and capacity for intelligent thought 
and self-regulation (Baumeister & DeWall, 2005, p. 56).
 Being ostracized, no matter the source, inhibits satisfaction of the need for 
relatedness. But what happens when one is the source of ostracism—when one 
ostracizes others? On the one hand, the case of the ostracizer is really just a species 
of the good friend, terrible stranger: the ostracizer, by systematically excluding 
others, actively deprives herself of opportunities to satisfy her need for relatedness, 
while setting herself up to be viewed poorly by those she excludes. But sometimes 
it seems that those who ostracize appear to enjoy and receive some benefit from 
their practice, particularly when they view themselves as part of a group unified by 
their poor treatment of others. Now, there is anthropological evidence suggesting 
that members of a group that ostracizes others feel more connected to the group 
(Gruter & Masters, 1986). However, this is a potentially misleading observation. 
After all, those who are part of a group that is ostracized likely feel connected to 
one another, but we would not want to say that they thereby satisfy their need 
for relatedness.10
 Simply believing one is connected to others is not enough to satisfy the need 
for relatedness; that ostracizers possess this belief does not establish that they 
satisfy their need for relatedness. To determine whether or not ostracizers really 
satisfy their need for relatedness, we have to examine their physical, psychological, 
and cognitive functioning pre-, during, and post- ostracizing. There has been 
remarkably little research conducted on the effects of excluding others. This is 
because psychologists are understandably more interested in studying the effects 
of being excluded and also because of the ethical and logistical limitations of 
studying social exclusion in the experimental setting.11 While conducting this line 
of research is challenging, there are some consistent conclusions emerging from 
the few attempts to do so. We know that subjects who are tasked with ostracizing 
others find doing so challenging (Williams & Sommer, 1997), even when they 
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primed to dislike those they are supposed to ostracize (Ciarocco, Sommer, & 
Baumeister, 2001). Ciarocco and colleagues also find that the participants who 
are required to ostracize perform more poorly afterwards on cognitive tasks (such 
as persisting at trying to solve unsolvable mental puzzles).
 This is the kind of research we need to reach an understanding of the effects 
ostracizing has upon the satisfaction of the ostracizer’s needs for relatedness. The 
preliminary results we have seen are consistent with the research on the nature 
of the need for relatedness discussed earlier. They are also, I think, consistent 
with most of our experiences. We are, after all, empathic beings. It is hard to 
ignore others and it is hard to exclude others. This is not to say that it is easy 
to act well towards others; but I expect most psychologically healthy adults can 
attest to how much easier it is to simply smile at someone, rather than to go out 
of one’s way to ignore or exclude her, or to otherwise make her feel bad. We are 
driven to treat others well, much more so than we might have anticipated.
 The conclusion we must embrace is that it is important to live on good terms 
with most of those we encounter: even if we have rewarding close relationships, 
when those around us are cold and impersonal, or fail to include us, the 
satisfaction of our need for relatedness is hindered. Moreover, as we have seen, the 
negative effects of this hindrance linger, making it difficult to compartmentalize 
seemingly isolated experiences of social exclusion. These findings give us good 
reason to regulate most—maybe, all—of our interactions with others. Just as the 
cold disposition of a stranger in the room can effect us negatively, so too does 
the cold stare of the person you cut in front of on the way to work; just as being 
left out of a game (by a computer!) negatively effects us, so too does being left 
out by any group, even a group of individuals you don’t “care” about. We’ve got 
to conclude that the person who believes she can fulfill her need for relatedness 
solely by developing a narrow circle of friends and family is wrong.
 The need for relatedness—along with our other psychological needs—is in 
this respect different from many of our biological needs. When we are hungry, 
we can eat a meal at home and then be content for several hours. Our need 
for nourishment is something that can be sated and then temporarily set aside. 
But our need for relatedness requires on-going satisfaction. And the more an 
individual engages in experiences which satisfy her need for relatedness, the more 
she will experience the positive effects that come with satisfaction of this, and 
other, innate psychological needs. Her executive functioning will operate at its 
highest level. She will be more effective in whatever she pursues.
How to relate to others?
 Having determined who we need to related to, let us now turn to the second 
question, that of how we need to relate to others. This question is an important 
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one, as it allows us to consider just how robust the need for relatedness is, a factor 
that influences significantly our evaluation of the eudaimonistic thesis.
 On the most general level, research suggests that what we need from others 
is a social environment that nurtures, provides warmth and security, and enables 
people to feel connected with one another (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 
2000; e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000). While obviously this entails that we need for 
others to care about us, Baumeister and Leary, among others (Rempel, Holmes, 
& Zanna, 1985; Ryff, 1989), find that much of the value of social interaction 
comes from not just from being cared, but also from caring about other people 
and becoming emotionally attached to them (1995, pp. 513–515). This suggests 
the importance of developing mutually affirming relationships, as opposed to 
one-sided relationships.
 Several studies on one-sided relationships suggest that one-sided interactions 
will not satisfy the need for relatedness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Baumeister, 
Wotman, & Stillwell, 1993). Regardless of which side a person is on (the cared 
about, or the caring), both parties experience the relationship as an “aversive” 
one (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). We have also seen, in our discussion of 
ostracism, that those who do not care about others or respect them experience 
the decreased cognitive functioning symptomatic of a failure to satisfy one’s need 
for relatedness (Ciarocco et al., 2001). All of this suggests that to satisfy our need 
for relatedness we need to develop actual attachments with others that include 
the presence of empathy and affection, as well as respect for others—an attitude 
that demonstrates our acceptance of others and our affirmation of their needs 
as ones that are important. Given that it is in this step—in the recognition of the 
need to develop mutually affirming attitudes—that the normative implications of 
the need for relatedness appear most transparently we need to consider seriously 
the extent to which mutuality is an essential characteristic of interactions which 
satisfy the need for relatedness.
 While for most of us the rewards of developing these kinds of attachments 
are clear, we also can appreciate how tempting it is to engage in patterns of 
behavior that lack the mutuality detailed above, yet nonetheless have the outward 
appearance of it: we engage with others, but really only view their relationship 
to us in instrumental terms; we care about what others think, but may not 
care about them. On this picture, our actions are predicated solely upon a self-
interested desire to be included and to garner the approval of the other, rather 
than upon any kind of desire for the other.12 If it were possible for interactions 
so motivated to satisfy our need for relatedness, this possibility would threaten 
the eudaimonistic thesis. We thus must consider: does our need for relatedness 
require simply that we need to be included, or does it really require something 
more, such as the need to develop mutual attitudes of care and respect, as the 
research on one-sided relationships and ostracism suggests?
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 To answer, let us take a look at research regarding the development of self-
esteem. All accounts of self-esteem hold that self-esteem is essentially dependent 
upon the responses of others; as we have seen, one influential account of self-
esteem posits that self-esteem has evolved as a mechanism to ensure that we 
satisfy our need for relatedness by making it the case that we develop self-esteem 
only when we are interacting well with others (Leary, 2004). By studying the 
development of self-esteem, we can gain valuable insight into when and how 
the need for relatedness is satisfied. Specifically, we want to explore what kinds 
of behaviors and attitudes correlate with stable levels of self-esteem, which have 
the strongest correlation with satisfaction of the need for relatedness (Paradise 
& Kernis, 2002).
Stability, Internal Qualities, and Motivation
 Ongoing research by Crocker (2002a; Crocker & Park, 2004), shows that 
stable levels of self-esteem tend to result from internal qualities related to one’s 
behavioral patterns, such as the exercise of virtue or development of religious faith, 
rather than from the possession of external qualities, such as one’s appearance 
and athletic success. The disparity arises because even though others may approve 
of external qualities, their approval generates a kind of self-esteem that is heavily 
contingent upon that approval. Crocker describes this kind of “contingent self-
esteem” as follows:
Contingencies of self-worth that are external rather than internal, or 
dependent on others rather than our own behavior, are much more 
vulnerable to threat on a day-to-day basis, and constantly require earning 
the approval of yet another person, winning yet another award, or 
outdoing yet another competitor (2002a, p. 600)
Crocker’s research finds that this vicious cycle of approval-seeking arises when 
what we really want is to secure the approval of others. We think we can secure 
this approval by having the kinds of external qualities that we think others will 
approve of: the right hairstyle, the latest technological gadget, and so on. But 
because these external qualities are essentially comparative, we are completely 
dependent upon the approval of others to fulfill our needs. What matters to us 
are not the possession of the specific qualities, but the having of approval: we 
want the qualities because we think others will approve of us if we have them. 
This kind of cycle unsurprising leads to destructive behavioral patterns that 
inhibit one’s well-being. For instance, those who base their self-worth on their 
appearance have higher incidences of alcohol and drug use, as well as eating 
disorders (Crocker, 2002a).
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 On the other hand, when we pursue internal qualities that we think are 
worthy of pursuit in their own right, independently of their contributions to our 
self-image, the threat of the vicious cycle lessens. We begin to develop an optimal, 
more stable form of self-esteem that, Crocker’s research suggests, better reflects 
the satisfaction of one’s need for relatedness (Crocker & Park, 2004). This form 
of self-esteem still depends on the approval of others, but this dependency plays 
out differently. We do not seek the approval of others; rather, we seek to develop 
qualities reflected through our behavior that we value independently of whether 
or not others approve of them and independently of the contributions they make 
to our self-image. Because we’ve essentially removed a concern for our self-image 
from the picture, we are better able to focus on obtaining the goals in question 
(Crocker et al., 2010). For instance, we can incorporate the feedback of others 
and make positive changes to our behavior, rather than seeing negative feedback 
as a personal assault and reacting defensively. Others will approve of our internal 
qualities, so long as they are admirable, yet overall our levels of self-esteem will 
be less contingent upon this approval, and so less vulnerable. If we find we are 
rebuffed on occasion, we are able to maintain firm ground in virtue of our 
commitment to the internal qualities—we do not find our self-esteem shattered, 
as is likely when the sources of self-esteem are external qualities wholly dependent 
upon the whims of others. The vicious cycle that arises when our self-esteem is 
based in external qualities is not likely to arise when our self-esteem is based in 
internal qualities. We thus are able to maintain stable levels of self-esteem.
 The following picture emerges: Stable levels of self-esteem suggest satisfaction 
of the need for relatedness. While stable levels of self-esteem are interdependent, 
they do not result solely from “being approved of” and rather result from a 
commitment to internal qualities exhibited through one’s behavior. What results 
solely from “being approved of” are contingent levels of self-esteem that correlate 
with destructive behavioral patterns. Thus, “being approved of” is not enough 
to satisfy our need for relatedness.
A Paradox of Self-Esteem?
 Further strengthening this line of argument, and so demonstrating the need 
to develop caring attitudes towards others, is evidence that the active pursuit of 
self-esteem imposes significant costs to individuals. As Crocker and Park (2004) 
note, while pursuing self-esteem may bring short-term benefits, the long-term 
costs to the satisfaction of one’s need for relatedness are significant. The standard 
explanation of this is that when people pursue self-esteem (e.g., by seeking the 
approval of others), their attention is diverted from the fulfillment of their needs 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Crocker, 2002b; Deci & Ryan, 2000). Crocker and 
Park take this explanation one step further, arguing, “in the pursuit of self-esteem, 
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people often create the opposite of what they need to thrive” (2004, p. 393). 
Our discussion of the vicious cycle of contingent self-worth gives us some insight 
into how this happens:  the active pursuit of self-esteem places one’s self-worth 
in the hands of others. We become highly vulnerable to their responses; this 
vulnerability often leads us to engage in self-protection techniques to protect 
ourselves against potential rejection. These responses in turn prevent us from 
making the requisite corrections to our behavior; they thus ultimately preventing 
us from develop qualities worthy of other’s approval (Crocker & Park, 2004, p. 
400; See also Tennen & Affleck, 1993).
 An example will help: Dana is a college student who bases her self-esteem 
in her grades. She pursues high grades to obtain the approval of others and sees 
the grades as a reflection of her self-worth. Because she is so caught up in the 
pursuit of her self-image, she engages in many strategies to protect herself in the 
face of rejection—strategies that ultimately thwart her academic development. For 
instance, in the face of the rejection that comes with a poor grade, she refuses 
to believe the poor grade is in fact a reflection on her and chooses to instead 
believe that the professor has not graded her fairly. As a result, Dana is unable 
to learn from the experience. In her eyes, the poor grade was not her fault, so 
there is no reason for her to seek extra help, or to study harder.
 In this example, we see that Dana’s specific motivation (gain self-esteem 
through getting good grades) serves to thwart her learning process. Were her 
ego less involved; were she motivated not to attain self-esteem, but to learn, then 
she would have been able to recognize her failures and to make the requisite 
adjustments to her learning process. This research finds that this is the case 
in most instances where individuals pursue self-esteem: when individuals are 
motivated by self-esteem, they fail to develop it. Crocker and Park thus conclude 
that self-esteem should never be seen as a goal, but rather as a bonus that results 
from the successful attainment of other goals (Crocker & Park, 2004, p. 407).
 Applying these results to the specific example of relationships, we can conclude 
reasonably that individuals who are motivated by a desire to attain the approval 
of others will fail to satisfy their need for relatedness for it is a self-defeating 
motive: seeking someone’s approval leads individuals to act in ways that inhibit 
the kinds of behavior generates the approval requisite to self-esteem; the approval 
that is reflective of satisfaction of the need for relatedness. The goal of “being 
approved of” thus generates a motivational state that is incompatible with satisfying 
one’s need for relatedness. Rather, to best satisfy the need for relatedness, one’s 
motive ought to focus on the person and the activity in question, as opposed to a 
separable outcome that is wrapped up on one’s own self-image—be it the outcome 
of obtaining approval, or obtaining some other advantage from the relationship. 
The kind of relatedness towards which we are driven, one in which we experience 
closeness and connectedness with others, arises only when we care about others 
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and respect them. We satisfy our need for relatedness to the degree to which we 
set aside our own interests and develop genuine feelings towards others.
 All of this suggests what most of us have known all along: that in order to 
develop fulfilling relationships, we must be motivated for the sake of the person, 
or for the sake of the relationship, rather than for the sake of securing some 
outcome of that relationship. We ought to be motivated by care for the other, 
or by respect for the other. Other things equal, this kind of motivation clearly 
secures satisfaction of the need for relatedness (Crocker, Olivier, & Nuer, 2009); 
the stable levels of self-esteem that result from this mode of behavior are a bonus.
Needing Others and the Eudaimonic Thesis
 We have seen now from many different angles that a lack of mutuality inhibits 
satisfaction of our need for relatedness. Interacting is not enough to satisfy our 
need, especially interacting for the sake of obtaining the approval of another. 
Rather, what we clearly require is positive social interaction marked by a mutual 
level of care and respect and that this is how we interact with most of those with 
whom we do interact. Requiring the development of mutually affirming attitudes 
helps to ensure that we will develop the kinds of relationships we need; that we 
need these relationships for the development of our well-being justifies the weight 
many moral theories tend to place on treating others well and viewing them as 
ends in themselves.
 Is this enough to vindicate—at least partially—the eudaimonistic thesis? The 
eudaimonistic thesis, recall, holds that being virtuous is a necessary component of 
true happiness. I’ve argued that we ought to understand this thesis as an empirical 
claim, where “true happiness” must be something that individuals can recognize 
as a state that is valuable for them. The above research shows that we will suffer 
on psychological, physical, and cognitive levels if we do not fulfill our need for 
relatedness by developing mutual attitudes of care and respect towards most of 
those we encounter and by behaving well towards them. But does it show that 
we cannot obtain true happiness without developing these attitudes (and so by 
being virtuous in this respect)?
 The immediate consequence of failing to exhibit virtuous attitudes towards 
others is the frustration of our need for relatedness. Let’s think a little about what 
this means: the need for relatedness is an innate psychological need that drives 
us to seek out certain kinds of experiences. As we’ve seen, this drive operates 
beyond our conscious control: we cannot just turn it off. We can ignore it, of 
course, but what happens when we ignore it is that the drive is continually stifled. 
We end up in a situation akin to one in which someone is constantly striving 
for something and failing to attain it. It is unsurprising that—as we’ve seen in 
detail—someone in such a situation of continually defeated strivings suffers on 
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multiple levels.
 The kind of negative effects we have seen to occur when the need for relatedness 
is frustrated are ones that prevent individuals from “positive functioning”. 
Positive functioning occurs when one’s drives are fulfilled—when an agent’s 
innate psychological needs point her towards certain kinds of experiences and 
when she engages in these experiences. I think the value associated with a state 
of positive functioning is best understood through analogy with the value of 
health. On its own, it has an intrinsic value: it is important for its own sake, just 
as one’s biological health is important for its own sake. There is a value to being 
in a state where we are not depressed, where we find ourselves motivated, where 
our cognitive operations are clicking away unfettered. This value is important on 
its own, independent both of the goods positive functioning allows us to attain 
and of our affirmation of it as valuable, just as there is independent value to 
having a body not inflicted with disease. Often times we may not recognize or 
appreciate the value of positive functioning until we try to seek further goods or, 
alternatively, until we lose it, finding ourselves depressed and unable to focus, 
but there is value nonetheless.
 Is positive functioning a plausible construal of “true happiness”? Clearly, 
it is an important aspect of true happiness, but I do not think that positive 
functioning is in itself a plausible candidate for true happiness. True happiness 
involves, I think, a combination of both functioning well and feeling good about 
the way in which one’s life is going. While some might find the latter to be most 
important, the truth is that we need positive functioning in order to develop 
the kind of stable and enduring sense of well-being associated with any plausible 
interpretation of “true happiness”. When we lack positive functioning, it may 
be possible to experience short bursts of pleasure or other joyful feelings, but in 
between those moments, we will struggle just to get by. We will fight off depression 
and anxiety; we will fumble at the ordinary tasks in life; we will find it difficult 
to pursue our goals. It is implausible to think that true happiness can lie in these 
kinds of isolated moments interjected in between this otherwise very grueling 
kind of life—at the end of the day, these fleeting feelings are not the only things 
that count.
Conclusion
 We are now in a position to assess the validity of the eudaimonistic thesis, at 
least insofar as it applies to our interpersonal relationships. The eudaimonistic 
thesis holds that being virtuous is necessary to the development of true happiness. 
If I’m right about what follows from research on the extent and nature of our 
need for relatedness, then it seems that exercising virtue in our interactions 
with others is necessary towards positive functioning. As positive functioning is 
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one important aspect of developing true happiness, then—in this sense—virtue 
is necessary for the development of true happiness. The eudaimonistic thesis is 
thereby validated.
 Of course, there is a catch: we have not shown that exercising virtue guarantees 
that one will develop true happiness. We thus have not proven Calvin’s skeptical 
stance wrong. True happiness, I have argued, consists in both positive functioning 
and developing good feelings about one’s life. While virtue is necessary to the 
former and, assuming normal social conditions, can guarantee the satisfaction of 
our need for relatedness, we cannot be sure that when we function well, we will 
feel a sense of well-being as a result. While the two are often correlated (Ryan, 
Huta, & Deci, 2006) and as I’ve suggested, positive functioning is requisite to 
developing a stable and enduring sense of well-being, whether or not we feel good 
about how our life is going depends on all sorts of factors that are very much 
beyond our control. Whether or not we feel good about how our life is going 
depends upon the nature of our goals and the extent to which we’ve been able 
to satisfy them; it depends upon whether we’ve been fortunate enough to find 
success in our chosen careers and in our chosen life paths. The young gay man 
feeling stifled in his small conservative community may not develop an enduring 
sense of well-being no matter how virtuous he is; the infertile women with deeply 
vested interests in procreating may never come to feel true happiness—no matter 
her virtue, there may always be a hole in her heart.
 Virtue cannot guarantee true happiness. Believing otherwise, we can now 
see, was Calvin’s mistake. Calvin assumed that being virtuous would on its own 
deliver true happiness. This is why he finds himself frustrated. And while Hobbes 
is likely right in his assertion that “virtue needs some cheaper thrills” (as long as 
those cheap thrills don’t come at the cost of virtue), there is no need for Calvin 
to rewrite the philosophy books. The eudaimonistic thesis gets it right, even if 
it doesn’t guarantee that virtue leads to true happiness.
 And I think this is the right way to think about the relationship between 
virtue and happiness. When we think about morality and what its aim and scope 
ought to be, it is important to recognize its limitations. It is a mistake to see the 
end of morality as ensuring that the virtuous develop true happiness, for whether 
or not the virtuous are able to develop true happiness is highly contingent upon 
luck and circumstance and something so contingent ought not to serve as the 
end goal of morality. When we declare something to be contained within the 
aim and scope of morality, we moralize it: we attach moral guilt and moral blame 
to its attainment, and hold it up as constitutive of our moral ideals. But where 
these ideals include aspects that are as beyond our control as is true happiness, 
then we have presented as an ideal something that is not one we reasonably 
can expect individuals to attain. At the same time, we are holding her morally 
responsible for her failures.
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 It is more reasonable, I think, to understand morality—and here, virtue—as 
having as its goal enabling us to develop the baseline of well-being, i.e., enabling 
us to develop positive functioning. This not only has the advantage of being 
something that is uniform across individuals, but also has the advantage of being 
something we can reasonably expect of others. The person who develops mutual 
attitudes of caring and respect towards those she interacts with will satisfy her 
need for relatedness; we will—in this respect—develop positive functioning.
 So, philosophers are not completely off-base in asserting, “True happiness 
comes from a life of virtue.” Virtue is essential to the development of true happiness. 
Recognizing the validity of the eudaimonistic thesis is important; establishing 
virtue’s connection with true happiness not only serves as a promising incentive 
for others to develop virtue, but also helps us to understand the nature and scope 
of virtue itself.
  Middlebury College
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Notes
1  The above describes the “Virtue needs some cheaper thrills” cartoon in the 
Calvin and Hobbes series reprinted, in Watterson (2005). Annas (1998) also 
discusses this example in a philosophical context.
2 Baumeister and Leary (1995) call it a “need for belongingness”.
3  It is worth emphasizing that the need drives us to engage in experiences and 
is thus satisfied only by those experiences. Experiencing belongingness can be 
very different than believing we belong: the adolescent girl may believe she 
belongs, yet find herself feeling lonely and despondent nonetheless.
4  Baumeister and Tice (1990) find such a strong correlation between the 
development of anxiety and threatened or actual social exclusion that they 
take anxiety itself to derive from our need to belong and to have as its purpose 
signaling distress when the satisfaction of one’s need is threatened.
5  See Baumeister & Leary (1995, pp. 508–509) for discussion of these effects 
and more.
6  Snow considers a similar case: “a person whose virtues allow him to have the 
close personal relationships needed for high levels of happiness, but whose 
other-regarding virtues do not extend beyond his family and members of his 
ethnic group” (2008, p. 238).
7  While this study focuses in particular on the relationship between perceived 
classroom experiments and the need for autonomy, Ryan and Deci later 
attribute the effect evidenced in this study to a satisfaction of the need for 
relatedness (presumably, in addition to the need for autonomy). See Ryan and 
Deci (2000, p. 71).
8 See Williams (2007) for extensive review of this literature.
9  Although, those who were ostracized by the computers reported higher levels 
of anger than those ostracized by strangers.
10  In one of the few studies that explores the psychological effects ostracism 
has on the individuals who ostracize, Zadro and colleagues (2005) do report 
that individuals who are part of a group that ostracizes others experience 
greater belongingness; however, they measure this belongingness according 
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to participant’s self-reported assessments of the degree to which they “felt a 
strong connection with the other two people on [the] train” and “felt included 
in the conversation” (Zadro et al., 2005, p. 130). This measure shows that the 
ostracizers believed they belonged. As we’ve seen, though, this belief is not 
sufficient to satisfy the need for belongingness. (Remember the isolated and 
depressed yet popular teenager.)
11 See Zadro et al (2005) for discussion.
12  Crocker and colleagues (2010) would describe the difference between these 
two motivational pictures in terms of ego-involvement; the former represents 
an egocentric motivation, in which the goal is ultimately wrapped up in the 
promotion of one’s self-image, while the latter represents ecocentric motivation, 
which is characterized by compassion, and in which the ego is absent.
24   Lorraine Besser-Jones
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